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“BRAIN DEATH”, AUTONOMY AND THE FUTURE OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION
Oana Iftime1
Abstract. Autonomy and its companion, informed consent is regarded as fundamental in contemporary medical ethics. Still, 
the individuals are deprived of the possibility to make a genuinely informed choice with respect to organ donation in the event 
of “brain death”. It can be easily argued, scientifically speaking, that the status of the “brain dead” patients is that of living 
beings, able to process nutrients and drugs and even to harbour and nourish their progeny into the womb. A philosophical, 
not scientific distinction between the “un-meaningful” lives of the “brain dead” and “meaningful” human life underlines the 
“brain death” concept. Yet, the public is told that the “brain dead” are dead, i. e. lacking life. Not only that this situation col-
lides with the principle of autonomy, but it also poses a risk for public trust in organ transplantation. It is obvious that people 
have certain expectancies from health care professionals and the decision makers, and finding out about such inconsistences 
might drive the public reject organ transplantation, with the recourse to the “brain death” concept ultimately leading to the 
aggravation of the organ shortage, instead of the alleviation that it was expected to bring. 
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Muerte cerebral, autonomía y el futuro del trasplante de órganos
Resumen: La autonomía y su manifestación en el consentimiento informado es considerada fundamental en la ética médica 
contemporánea. Sin embargo, a los individuos se les priva de la posibilidad de realizar una elección informada genuina cuando 
se trata de donación de órganos en el caso de “muerte cerebral”. Puede fácilmente argumentarse, científicamente hablando, que 
el estatuto de paciente con “muerte cerebral” es el de un ser vivo, capaz de procesar nutrientes y fármacos, incluso mantener 
y nutrir la progenie en el útero.  El concepto de “muerte cerebral” está basado en una distinción filosófica, no científica, entre 
la vida “sin significado” del que tiene el “cerebro muerto” y la vida “con sentido”. Sin embargo, a las personas se les dice que 
las personas con el “cerebro muerto” están muertas, carecen de vida. Esta situación no solamente colisiona con el principio 
de autonomía, sino que también supone un riesgo para la confianza pública en el trasplante de órganos. Es obvio que las 
personas tienen ciertas expectativas acerca de la toma de decisiones de los profesionales de la salud, y el conocer tales incon-
sistencias podría llevar a que las personas rechacen el trasplante de órganos con el recurso de “muerte cerebral”, conduciendo 
a la agravación en el bajo suministro de órganos, en vez del alivio que se espera conseguir.
Palabras clave: autonomía, muerte cerebral, trasplante de órganos, confianza pública en el cuidado de la salud
“Morte cerebral”, autonomia e o futuro do transplante de orgãos
Resumo: Autonomia e seu complemento, consentimento informado, são considerados como fundamentais em ética médica 
contemporânea. Ainda assim, as pessoas são privadas da possibilidade de fazer uma escolha informada genuína com respeito 
à doação de órgãos no caso de “morte cerebral”. Pode ser facilmente argumentável, cientificamente falando, que a condição 
de pacientes com “morte cerebral” é a de seres vivos, capazes de processar nutrientes e medicamentos, e mesmo de abrigar e 
nutrir sua descendência no útero. Uma distinção filosófica, não científica, entre a vida “sem sentido” da “morte cerebral” e a 
vida humana “significativa” enfatiza o conceito de “morte cerebral”. Contudo, ao público é dito que os com “morte cerebral” 
estão mortos, isto é, sem vida. Esta situação não apenas colide com o princípio da autonomia como também constitui um 
risco para a confiança pública no transplante de órgãos. É óbvio que as pessoas tem certas expectativas sobre os profissionais 
de cuidados à saúde e os que tomam decisões, e encontrar tais inconsistências pode levar o público a rejeitar o transplante de 
órgãos, com a utilização do conceito de “morte cerebral” levando, em última instância, ao agravamento da escassez de órgãos 
ao invés da atenuação que era esperada trazer.
Palavras-chave: autonomia, morte cerebral, transplante de órgãos, confiança pública em cuidados à saúde
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to perform invasive surgery in view of the remov-
al of their vital organs, which would be consid-
ered criminal if performed on a living patient. It 
should be mentioned that “brain death” diagno-
sis kept differing from state to state and period 
to period. The pertinent remark that Levin and 
Whyte made 30 years ago, namely that “Clini-
cal criteria make it possible to be brain dead in 
one country and not in another”(4:852) proved 
to be perpetually valid(5-7). To this day one can 
be dead into one jurisdiction and alive in another, 
alive today and dead tomorrow, not because of a 
change of medical condition, but due to variabil-
ity in brain death diagnosis criteria and practice. 
Efforts were made towards establishing universal 
guidelines for the determination of death(8,9) 
still the issue remains unsolved. An interesting 
point is that Japan, for example, relegated the re-
sponsibility at the individual level – let the indi-
vidual decide whether he/she should be treated as 
alive or as dead and an organ donor in the event 
of “brain death”(10). Deciding who is dead cu-
riously becomes a matter of choice, and so does 
whether vital organs removal from a heart beat-
ing individual should be punished as infliction 
of grievous bodily harm ultimately leading to the 
death of the victim, or praised as an achievement 
of medical art. Nevertheless, even if “brain death” 
criteria and practices would be adopted into an 
international standardized form they would fi-
nally do nothing more than confirming the fact 
that the subject does correspond to the condition 
called “brain death”, formally accepted as a legal 
criterion of death. The fallacy embedded into the 
Harvard Report would still be there and trans-
forming it into an argumentum ad populum by 
universal acceptance of certain standards in diag-
nosis would not correct it. 
As it shall be shown in the following, the scien-
tific arguments demonstrating that the “brain 
dead” are not dead, i. e. lacking life are basic, easy 
to perceive and in the nowadays globalized world 
would be also easy to disseminate. Public’s aware-
ness of the inconsistencies of the “brain death” 
concept might rise. Obviously people have cer-
tain expectancies from health care professionals 
and the decision makers in health care, and find-
ing out that they are no strangers to confusion 
in their discourse on “brain death” might have 
Introduction
Contemporary Bioethics promotes autonomy 
as one of the fundamental principles. Still, au-
tonomy2 is hampered when the individuals are 
deprived of the possibility to make a genuinely 
informed choice with respect to organ donation 
in the event of “brain death”. From a scientific 
perspective it can be easily argued that the claim 
that the “brain dead” are lacking life fails basic 
examination. Even some of the promoters of the 
“brain death” construct sustain that it should be 
openly admitted that these subjects are alive – yet 
“dead enough to donate”(1:148). Still, the larger 
public continues to be told that “brain death” is 
true death, i.e. lack of life, and so people’s option 
regarding organ donation in such circumstances 
relies upon an induced false belief.
Inconsistencies and misrepresentations have ac-
companied the “brain death” concept for the past 
fifty years. Prior to the 1968 Harvard Report(2), 
“comatose individuals who have no discernible 
central nervous system activity”(2:85) were con-
sidered alive and taken care of as such. After the 
Harvard Report the same individuals with the 
same characteristics should be considered dead 
– even though still taken care of, in view of or-
gan retrieval. Suddenly A was no longer identical 
with A, a typical violation of the law of identity 
leading to the informal logical fallacy known as 
equivocation. Following Harvard, illogicality 
kept finding its way into state documents. The 
Uniform Determination of Death Act proclaims 
that “An individual who has sustained either (1) 
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respira-
tory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain, including the brain 
stem, is dead”(3:2). One can easily notice that 
“brain dead” subjects are alive and dead at the 
same time, i. e. alive according to criterion 1, and 
dead according to criterion 2. 
Many states came to accommodate the “brain 
death” criterion of death into their legislation, 
consequently designing the legal frame allow-
ing organ harvesting from “brain dead” donors. 
Once pronounced “legally dead” it becomes legal 
2 It can be argued that the other fundamental principles are also 
contradicted by organ removal from “brain dead” donors, but this 
will not constitute the object of the present paper.
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cesses of another organism, growing inside them. 
Actually, the case of “brain dead” mothers points 
out that at least some of the “brain dead” subjects 
can be assisted for much longer than currently 
in general use, which leaves utilitarian reasons (i. 
e. organ retrieval and/or lessening of the burden 
they represent) as the only basis for early with-
drawal of support in “brain dead” patients who 
are still reacting to care. 
The “life support” argument
Some claim that the “brain dead” exhibit a mis-
leading “alive” appearance due to the fact that 
the machines they are connected to make them 
breathe, but such assertions are utterly unsci-
entific. Obviously, what is called “life support” 
cannot give life or maintain it forcefully – if it 
could, then nobody would have died anymore in 
contemporary times! “Life support” can only help 
living organisms to cope with their state of illness. 
Ventilators fill the lungs with air, but a dead or-
ganism would not be able to transport the oxygen 
provided to the cells and use it(16) as it would 
neither be able to perform all other typical for the 
living processes that take place at the cellular and 
subcellular level and are all needed, besides the 
oxygen supply, in order for the heart to keep beat-
ing(17). Aerobic metabolism decreases in “brain 
dead” but it does not cease and can be restored to 
adequate levels by hormone therapy(18), which 
became part of current organ donor management. 
When death does occur, cessation of all processes 
characteristic for the living organism leads to a 
series of post mortem changes that are not pres-
ent in “brain dead” individuals. Those changes 
are rigor mortis (stiffening, due to locking of con-
tractile proteins in the muscles deprived of ATP), 
livor mortis (due to absence of circulation fol-
lowed by gravitational settling of the blood in the 
lower portion of the body), algor mortis (cadaveric 
body cooling, different from the treatable hypo-
thermia experienced by the “brain dead”), and de-
composition (rotting of the body, with blue-dark 
green discoloration, gaseous distension, degradation 
of tissues, ultimately followed by dissolution of 
bodily structures)(19). Most post mortem chang-
es follow the moment of death within a few hours 
and should be observable in all “brain dead” indi-
viduals. As for decomposition, its onset is detect-
undesirable consequences in the long term. 
Standards of care for the dead
Nutrients and liquids are administered to the 
“brain dead” and waste is eliminated by their or-
ganism(11), a fact which requires a huge number 
of processes taking place into the cells into a co-
ordinated manner and is numbered by Biology 
among the fundamental traits of the living. An 
entity that assimilates nutrients and water and 
produces urine and perspiration is by no means 
dead – the dead consume nutrients and water 
only in legends and horror movies. 
“Brain dead” subjects also receive lots of drugs, 
as they are treated for all consequences of their 
brain injuries and any other conditions till the 
day their organs are removed. They are adminis-
tered vasopressors, hormones, diuretics, electro-
lytes, antibiotics a. o. according to the practical 
experience accumulated in “brain dead” donors 
care(12,13). Scientifically speaking, it is beyond 
doubt that dead bodies do not react to drugs 
and use them so that to maintain physiological 
parameters – drugs have to be uptaken by the 
cells and dealt with adequately, molecules to be 
actively fabricated in order to build the proper re-
sponse and express it. It should also be mentioned 
that sustained treatment becomes necessary due 
to the systemic reactions developed by the “brain 
dead” individual’s organism – which is therefore 
biologically reactive, i. e. not dead – in response 
to brain injuries(14). 
“Brain dead” donors are continuously monitored 
and specific physiological targets are set – a “brain 
dead” should exhibit a heart rate of 60-120/min, 
systolic blood pressure of 100-160 mmHg, and 
an urine output of 50-100 ml/hr(11). It is easy to 
notice that these parameters are perfectly suitable 
for living individuals, which leads to the conclu-
sion that either the “brain dead” are very much 
alive or ... the majority of people are in fact walk-
ing dead.
Women in “brain death” can be assisted for 
months, till they give birth(15). For biologists it 
is crystal clear that cadavers cannot go on with 
their own living processes – and so they become 
cadavers – let alone contribute to the living pro-
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organ harvesting procedures imply anaesthesia, 
monitoring, and support – the donor is operat-
ed on and preparations such as small dissections 
and cannulations are made for the extraction of 
organs, whilst “the donor’s heart so far has con-
tinued beating spontaneously and maintained 
circulation of all organs”(25:¶3 under “Donor 
operation”), circulation that will be discontinued 
by clamping of the aorta. The heart is removed 
first, followed by lungs, liver, pancreas, intestine, 
kidneys a.s.o.
It has been documented long ago (26-28) that the 
“brain dead” donors can display during surgery 
increase in the blood pressure, tachycardia, per-
spiration, lacrimation, and muscular movements, 
reactions perfectly coherent with what Biology 
describes as the acute stress response (a. k. a. “the 
fight-or-flight response”), perfectly suitable for 
a living subject submitted to extremely invasive 
procedures. They may also perform rather exten-
sive actions, disrupting the harvesting procedure: 
“The donor has just moved his right arm and is 
lifting his right thigh from the stretcher. The pan-
ic spreads among the nurses, but some doctors 
also appear perplexed; the anesthesiologist spends 
at least 15 min calming tempers in the operat-
ing room. He protests loudly, excitedly waving a 
piece of paper—the death certificate— and then 
he explains more calmly that all examinations and 
tests have established the cerebral death of the 
man”(29:47-48); and a second testimony, about 
another “brain dead” donor: “All vascular struc-
tures emerging from the heart were isolated and 
encircled, and just when the ascending aorta was 
clamped, the donor moved and delivered with his 
left arm a powerful punch to the abdomen of my 
assistant. After a moment of hesitation, the aortic 
clamp was released, and the blood flow was re-
sumed in the aorta; the donor was still moving—
this time his right leg. With a thousand thoughts 
in my mind, seconds felt like hours. The glazed 
look in the scrub nurse’s eyes and the echoing 
nurses excited words, somebody screams that this 
is a desperate act of a man against the donation. 
The abdominal surgeon appears extremely reso-
lute and exclaims, “clamped the aorta, we start 
the perfusion,” and in an automatic way, I do the 
same, without hiding my anxiety and nervous-
ness”(29:48).
able within one to three days and it should have 
been observed stage by stage, down to dissolution 
in pregnant “brain dead” women that have been 
assisted for months. 
Speaking of assisted vital functions, pacemaker pa-
tients and those in need of dialysis are individuals 
whose abnormal functioning of some vital organs 
would lead to death unless assisted by the adequate 
devices – if the “brain dead” should be considered 
dead because they depend on machines, an obvious 
logical question would be if pacemaker bearers and 
dialysis patients should also be pronounced dead 
and eventually have their organs harvested.
Still, what is the public told about brain death and 
“brain dead” donors? “Brain death is permanent and 
irreversible. It is a legal definition of death. How-
ever, the vital organs such as the heart, lungs, liver, 
pancreas and kidneys can be kept viable for a few 
days if supported by artificial or mechanical sup-
port”(20:¶1 under “What does brain death mean?”); 
“Though there is irreversible loss of all brain func-
tion and the patient is clinically and legally dead, 
the appearance of life continues. This is only because 
of a breathing machine (ventilator), which is an ar-
tificial means for delivering enough oxygen to the 
heart to keep it beating”(21:¶4); ”Remember that 
your loved one is already legally dead and removing 
the ventilator does not cause death. Saying goodbye 
to a loved one who is brain dead is a very difficult 
experience. Your loved one may look as if he or she 
is only sleeping. The ventilator fills the lungs with 
air. The heart monitors may indicate that the heart 
is still beating. Your loved one may be warm to the 
touch and have color in the face. But, in fact, your 
loved one is dead”(22:6). Also, “Once a person is de-
clared brain dead, families are not asked to ‘pull the 
plug’ or to take someone ‘off of life support’ because 
such actions would be impossible: the person they 
love has already died”(23:¶1 under “No One ‘Pulls 
the Plug’”). Indeed, the family is not asked to take 
the donor off life support as it is the job of a member 
of the transplantation team to do that.
Surgery, not autopsy
As already mentioned above brain injury conse-
quences are to be kept under control and “tar-
get perioperative cardiopulmonary parameters in 
multiorgan donors”(24:135) should be met. The 
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ing from the spinal cord. But, reactivity and the 
ability to move characterize the living, again re-
quiring myriads of processes to take place within 
the cells and into the body as a whole. Dead or-
ganisms should not respond to stimuli by stimu-
lus-provoked movements, or perform spontane-
ous movements – not to mention that the pres-
ence of reflexes should invalidate the brain death 
diagnostic by definition(35). Yet, the practical 
solution to that obvious lack of coherence was 
not invalidation of the “brain death” diagnostic 
in subjects exhibiting movements but postulating 
that movements are compatible with the “brain 
death” diagnostic, which gets to be literally pos-
tulated, and expanded ad libitum: “Although by 
definition the diagnosis of brain death requires 
the irreversible loss of cerebral function, includ-
ing the brainstem, it appears that all functions are 
not immediately lost. Several functions including 
complex spinal automatisms have been reported 
in patients with brain death and these spinal re-
flexes can be maintained for up to several hours 
or days”(33:2377); “Although spontaneous and 
reflex spinal movements may be present during 
the first 24 hours, they do not invalidate the diag-
nosis. The nature of these movements may be elu-
cidated via electrophysiological, functional imag-
ing, or blood flow studies, leading in future to the 
development of a standardized protocol. Given 
the myriad of practical and legal implications re-
volving around the diagnosis of BD, our purpose 
is to alert the health care community about the 
various types of movements that can be accepted 
in these circumstances without invalidating the 
diagnosis”(32:159).
Redefining the stimulus-provoked movements of 
the “brain dead” as “brain death-associated reflex-
es” and their spontaneous movements as “brain 
death-associated automatisms” that “do not con-
tradict the diagnosis of death” came also as an op-
tion, in total agreement with the 1968 Harvard 
Committee’s spirit of unscientific redefinition 
and postulation that apparently tends to imprint 
everything related to “brain death” ever since: “In 
the setting of brain death, we propose using the 
terms brain death-associated reflexes and brain 
death-associated automatisms. This terminol-
ogy is clinically useful because all movements 
reported in brain dead bodies can be placed in 
One might wonder what would have happened 
if the “brain dead” donor’s punch caused some 
serious injury – would the police have had to file 
a report on “battery by a dead individual”? Prob-
ably not, as the offender was legally dead, at the 
time of the offence. However, since such reactiv-
ity on behalf of supposedly dead subjects might 
rise doubt, anaesthetists are instructed to deprive 
the “brain dead” of the possibility to manifest 
their capacity to react: “Faced with the knowl-
edge of the persistence of higher brain and spi-
nal function in some donors, the inability to test 
the reticular formation directly and the dramatic 
perioperative haemodynamic changes that occur, 
sedation and analgesia should be given with mus-
cle relaxation for organ donation. It is imperative 
that public confidence is maintained in the trans-
plant programme”(30:106). Indeed, it was docu-
mented that due to the spontaneous reactions of 
the “brain dead”, nurses may come to question 
organ retrieval from such donors: “One disquiet-
ing issue for nurses in this study was lack of con-
fidence that the patient was actually dead. Nurses 
reported patients reacting when moved and ques-
tioning why patients ‘required pain medication’ if 
they were in fact dead”(31:433).
The restless dead
The various types of movements – some stimulus-
provoked and other spontaneous – observed in 
“brain dead” individuals are listed in literature as 
deep tendon reflexes, plantar withdrawal, plan-
tar flexor responses, abdominal reflexes, neck-arm 
flexion, neck-hip flexion, neck abdominal reflex, 
tendon reflexes in the upper and lower extremities, 
extension-pronation arm reflex (extension and pro-
nation of the arm and forearm in response to cu-
taneous stimulation), undulating toe reflex, triple 
flexion response, the Lazarus sign (that may include 
shoulder adduction, moving of the arms towards the 
chest and of the hands to the neck and lower ex-
tremity movements), leg movements mimicking leg 
movement during sleep, eyelid opening and closing, 
spontaneous low frequency respiratory-like move-
ments(32), fasciculations (muscle twitches)(33), 
head turning(34), and other.
It was claimed that the many types of movements 
present in “brain dead” individuals are all purely 
reflex (i. e. not voluntary and oriented), originat-
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tion of meaningful neurological function from 
the cessation of cardiorespiratory function. The 
rationale for this distinction was that the former 
represented human existence, while the latter was 
viewed simply as biological existence”(5:532). 
The Harvard criteria are regarded as defining “the 
end of meaningful human life”(39:344), mandat-
ing cessation of the “un-meaningful” life of the 
“brain dead” individual in favour of those con-
sidered to be still living the “meaningful” version. 
Obviously, such distinction is by no means sci-
entific, but philosophical. Philosophy left aside, 
what persists is a cynical proclamation of the fact 
that the “brain dead” do have life – a fact that 
should be obviously incompatible with organ re-
moval, at least from a classical ethics viewpoint. 
Under these circumstances, some advocate for 
abandoning the “dead donor rule”, in order to 
“honor and pursue truth”(1:148), as “Once phy-
sicians understand that brain dead and DCD 
donors are not really dead, they could claim oth-
erwise only at the cost of undermining integrity 
and diminishing character”(1:148) and propose 
that we should openly move to allowing organ 
removal not only from dead individuals but also 
from dying patients, for the benefit of all parties 
involved: “The driving force behind rejecting the 
DDR is the ethical norm that physicians should 
not cause the death of a patient. Yet, we do ex-
actly that when we ethically and justifiably with-
draw life support at the request of the patient or 
proxy-surrogate, or when we remove organs from 
brain dead or DCD donors who are not actually 
dead. Once we recognize that the ethical prohibi-
tion against physicians causing death of a patient 
is not absolute and that the guiding principles are 
respect for patients’ self-determination and vol-
untary informed consent, we can withdraw life 
support in intensive care units and recover organs 
from consenting donors without appeal to the 
DDR and its underlying fictions. Abandoning 
the DDR will eliminate all of the public’s and 
health care professionals’ confusion and misun-
derstanding about definitions of death and decid-
ing when someone is dead”(1:148).
In some ethical/moral systems there might be no 
problem if organs are harvested from a dying per-
son who expressed his/her informed consent for 
organ removal before death occurs, in the event 
one of these two categories. Furthermore, it does 
not imply a particular mechanism, which remains 
speculative in some cases. Although primarily 
descriptive, these terms have important implica-
tions. Brain death-associated reflexes are stimulus 
provoked movements that do not contradict the 
diagnosis of death. Such movements may or may 
not be present during life. Thus, subsets of these 
reflexes include muscle stretch reflexes, abdomi-
nal reflexes, and plantar flexion. Likewise, brain 
death-associated automatisms are spontaneous 
movements that do not contradict the diagnosis 
of death”(36:125).
Into the context, some assert that on one hand 
physicians should be aware of “reflex movements 
that can occur in braindead patients”(37:589) so 
that the diagnosis of brain death is not delayed 
or disputed and on the other hand that “brain 
death should be undertaken with circumspec-
tion, particularly when related to organ trans-
plantation”(37:590). But, what is left of “circum-
spection” when doctors are openly suggested to 
postulate diagnostics and expand them so that to 
accommodate elements that should contradict 
those diagnostics by definition? The astonishing-
ly unscientific idea that the dead could actually 
move, so manifesting the ... reflex activity of their 
dead bodies seems to be creatively assisted so that 
it obliterates the objective alternative, namely 
that the “brain death” diagnostic might prove in-
appropriate in nearly half(32) of the [erroneously 
considered] “brain dead” donors, which should 
preclude organ harvesting from all those subjects.
“Dead enough to donate”
Some of the promoters of the “brain death” con-
cept are not claiming anymore that “brain dead” 
individuals are inanimate organisms, but openly 
support the utilitarian thesis that “brain-dead 
patients are dead enough to donate their or-
gans”(38:110). 
A distinction between the existence of the “brain 
dead” and what should be separately regarded as 
“human” existence was introduced, in order to 
justify why the “brain dead” should be viewed as 
mere organ sources: “The concept of brain death 
was first described in the medical literature in 
1959, and was an attempt to separate the cessa-
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dead” patients strongly reacting to the invasive 
procedures they are subjected to in the operating 
room can be expected to accumulate. In these cir-
cumstances, it can be anticipated that the public 
becomes legitimately suspicious and reject organ 
transplantation in principle.
Conclusive remarks
Unfortunately, nowadays those who agree to or-
gan removal in the event of “brain death” express 
in fact a technically invalid consent, based upon 
the induced false believe that the “brain dead” are 
lacking life. Scientifically speaking, “brain dead” 
subjects are not deprived of life3. They are deeply 
injured individuals who are actually killed dur-
ing the organ harvesting procedure when their 
circulation is discontinued and they are deadly 
wounded by removal of the heart – and maybe 
it is worth mentioning that the Harvard Report 
initially spoke about them as “desperately in-
jured”(2:85). Philosophically speaking, they were 
labelled by some as subjects leading an un-mean-
ingful life who should necessarily “help” those liv-
ing the meaningful version of human existence. 
However, the public is misled about the scientific 
aspects and forced to accept the philosophical 
conclusions by games of words that become the 
basis for life and death decisions, either taken for 
oneself or in the even thornier situation of act-
ing as a surrogate decision maker. Such assault on 
individuals’ autonomy into a world that restlessly 
discourses about “rights” and the “four principles 
of medical ethics” is pretty astonishing.
The fact that many doctors accept the “brain 
death” construct without scrutiny, even though 
such scrutiny would require knowledge pertain-
ing to basic training, common to professionals 
in Biology and Medicine is also surprising. One 
would expect that matters of life and death be ap-
proached with more scrupulousness, if not as well 
with more reverence. As for the utilitarian ap-
proach to medicine, even if there should be room 
under the sun for it, too, it definitely should not 
be forced upon the others or its values be imposed 
by deceitful means. 
3 As a biologist, I was very surprised by how unscientific could the 
basis of the claim that the “brain dead” are dead be – and it should 
be mentioned that the dozens of life scientists enrolled in master’s 
degree and human resources development programs that I encoun-
ter as a Bioethics teacher are habitually equally surprised.
of illness or injuries that might be incompatible 
with long term survival. But, as already shown 
above the public is systematically misguided with 
respect to “brain death” – which is presented as 
genuine lack of life – and therefore deprived of 
making a genuinely informed choice. In present, 
those who give consent for organ removal in the 
event of “brain death” are misled in their option 
and actually express a technically invalid consent, 
based upon the induced false believe that the 
“brain dead” are truly dead: “A key point is that 
individuals are not able to understand the issues, 
and therefore cannot give informed consent to 
organ donation, if they do not receive accurate 
information about the procedure. They should 
know that, in current practice, most organs for 
transplant are taken from “brain dead” individu-
als who are not dead in the sense that their circu-
lation and respiration have ceased, or that their 
brains are really and truly dead. They should be 
aware that the diagnosis of “brain death” is not 
soundly based or universally accepted, and that 
there are serious questions about its constituting 
the death of the person”(40:408).
An aspect that remains to be established is how 
many of the health care practitioners and decision 
makers mislead the public on purpose and how 
many do that sincerely believing that the “brain 
dead” are mere cadavers. Dolus, or fault would be 
the legal question, if organ removal in the case of 
“brain death” would have constituted the object 
of – let us take the liberty of using a movie sce-
nario artifice here – a contract between the state 
and the donating individual. The main problem 
would however be that it might be too late for 
those who consented to organ removal to bring 
before the court an action for annulment.
The long-term damage
Continuing to harvest organs from “brain dead” 
donors under the pretext that they are dead, i. 
e. lacking life, in spite of all scientific evidence 
that proves the opposite might lead to undermin-
ing of public trust in the medical profession and 
the decision structures. In the long run, not only 
that human physiology would not change, and 
the above mentioned arguments would persist 
and be always at hand for anyone, but also more 
and more “inappropriate” stories involving “brain 
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scientifically speaking and that the turn in defin-
ing death was essentially philosophical in nature 
becomes evident for the public we might conse-
quently face strong rejection of organ transplan-
tation, the recourse to the “brain death” concept 
ultimately leading to aggravation of the organ 
shortage, instead of the alleviation that it was ex-
pected to bring.
Not only that the principle of autonomy is at 
stake here, but so might also be the public trust 
in health care in general and in organ transplanta-
tion in particular. People are naturally reluctant 
to being deceived and being deceived about life 
and death is no small matter. It is not unreason-
able to anticipate that if the fact that there is no 
case for the claim that the “brain dead” are dead, 
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